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that expresses them the most clearly with all their necessary implications, rather than one that would attempt to classify the system under some popularly acceptable designation. He quotes continually from Spinoza's own words, and always gives the exact reference to the passage quoted in order that contexts may be consulted and translations verified, and in equivocal cases furnishes in a footnote the original expression in Latin, or Dutch where the Latin is not extant. The book will certainly be a great benefit to all who begin to make the acquaintance of Spinoza through his somewhat confusing writings, and to those whose patience is tried by the conflicting opinions of his many critics. In its fairness and direct treatment it will be welcome also to the experienced student of this somewhat troublesome philosopher whom Pierre Bayle has styled "the greatest atheist that ever lived."

THE DIVINE NAME IN EXODUS, III, 14. By *William R. Arnold*. Reprinted from the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1905.

The passage which is the subject of this article reads: "And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM has sent me unto you. And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me unto you; this is my name forever, and this is my memorial unto all generations."

The problem consists in this, that Yahveh here reveals his name to Moses, and yet he does not use the name "Yahveh," but the word '*Ehyeh*' which is translated in our version by "I am." Professor Arnold claims, not without a good support of argument, that this should not be translated "I am," but must be regarded as a name, which is simply a substitute for the word Yahveh, and replaced the latter at a time when the name was deemed so holy that it was considered blasphemous to utter it even in reverence. Such substitutions were quite common, and the substitution '*Ehyeh*' which literally means "I shall be," is one of them.

The preceding passage, "I am that I am," should according to Professor Arnold be cut out as a later gloss which crept in the text and had originally been written as a marginal note to explain the name '*Ehyeh*', "I shall be," incorporating the redactor's interpretation of this new and uncommon appellation of God.

Professor Arnold further insists that the idea of eternity is not in the mind of the author, in either the original passage or the added gloss, for such an abstract conception of God as representing "existence," or even "eternal existence" is absolutely foreign to the ancient Israelites. It is a modern idea and smacks more of Greek philosophy than of ancient Semitic religion. It might be Indian or modern but not Hebrew, and he explains the gloss to mean "I will be whatever I choose."

The name Yahveh, originally used exclusively by the Southern tribes only, is here for the first time introduced into the Elohim text. It is not used for the first time in the Old Testament, but it is new to the Elohist writer who now adopts it for the entire people as the name of the God of Israel. Therefore Yahveh is here identified with the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and it is added "This [the name Yahveh] is my name forever,

and this my designation for generation after generation." But in spite of this inevitable requirement of the context, God calls himself not "Yahveh" but by the substitute "Ehyeh."

There can be no doubt that the original text must have read "Yahveh" in the place of '*Ehyeh*', and the substitution can only have taken place at the time when the name Yahveh was no longer pronounced.

But why this uncommon substitute in this important passage?

In most passages the four letters (*yhvḥ*) were pronounced Adonaj or Lord, and accordingly receive the vowels of Adonaj (ă ō a) thus producing the word Jēhovah, but in our passage the substitution "Lord" is obviously out of place and so another substitution had to be made.

Professor Arnold argues that the date of the present reading can not have been before the end of the fourth century, and not later than the end or the middle of the third century B. C. Accordingly the reading '*Ehyeh*' for Yahveh was substituted between 300 and 500 B. C.

The essay contains almost sixty pages, and is painstaking as well as thorough, and also convincing. We are inclined to believe that Professor Arnold has spoken the last word concerning this much mooted passage. P. C.

L'ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE. Publiée par *Alfred Binet*. 12me année. Paris: Masson, 1906. Pp. 672.

This year of M. Binet's publication is a very interesting and valuable contribution to the literature of psychology. Each of the contributors might well claim our attention in a special review, but we will confine ourselves to a more particular mention of the last of the original essays, which is Professor Mach's résumé of his views on the relation of physics and psychology ("Rapports de la physique avec la psychologie"). He introduces himself as "neither a philosopher nor psychologist, but simply a physicist," whose interest in psychology lies chiefly in the part of that science which is of importance to physicists, viz., the physiology of sensation, and arises from questions relating to the theory of consciousness and methodology. To make clear his philosophical point of view he sums up the sequence of his personal studies which contributed in determining it. First comes the strong influence of Kant in his Prolegomena, then Berkeley, then Hume. His study in physics and its history taught him that science has for its true end the discovery of the relations of dependence between the data of sense-perceptions, and that the concepts and theories of physics only constitute one simple means, realizing an economy of thought, toward the attainment of his end. Then he abandoned all metaphysical interpretation of physics, considering the psychic life in general and scientific work in particular as an aspect of organic life.

Mach maintains that the ideal of science should be to grasp with as great economy of thought as possible and on the basis of exact investigation, the mutual dependence of the internal and external experiences of man. With characteristic modesty he claims exclusive right to none of the ideas expressed in this essay, but believes that in the conciliation of these ideas one result may be seen of the general development of civilization.

ZARATHUSHTRA, PHILO, THE ACHAEMENIDS AND ISRAEL. By *Lawrence H. Mills*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. Pp. 460.